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This paper focuses on ethnic pro¿ ling. Besides providing a description of the concept and 
introducing a recent, groundbreaking Hungarian empirical research project on police 
pro¿ ling, I will also highlight the international context within which pro¿ ling should be 
seen. This does not only include the assessment of the most important legal and political 
debates and frameworks regarding pro¿ ling by law enforcement agencies, but also the 
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analysis of the elusive concept of security, based on which the ef¿ cacy, and thereby the 
constitutionality of certain law enforcement measures may be scrutinized. Empirical 
¿ ndings with a thorough methodology on the actual ef¿ ciency of law enforcement measures 
like offender, or potential offender pro¿ ling are of corollary importance, because the well- 
established principle of constitutional balancing, a core feature in jurisprudence, as well as 
in legislation, policy making and law enforcement refers to the process of weighing how 
intrusive certain means are in comparison to the ends–provided of course, that the ends are 
legitimate. The concept of proportionality is central here: in order to assess the relationship 
between the means employed and the aims sought to be realized, one needs to asses three 
criteria: effectiveness, necessity, and the degree of harm inÀ icted. Under the effectiveness 
criterion, what is meant is the ability of the concrete measure to achieve the ends for which 
it was conceived and this includes consideration of the extent to which the measure in 
question has led to identi¿ cation of criminals, along with the extent to which the measure in 
question affects the ability of the police to work with minority groups to identify criminals 
and the extent to which the measure in question may divert the police away from identifying 
real criminal activities. The necessity criterion refers to the existence or otherwise of other, 
less invasive measures available in order to achieve the same aim. Finally, the harm criterion 
involves scrutiny of the extent to which the concrete measure affects the rights of the 
individual (right to respect for private and family life, right to liberty and security, right to 
be free from discrimination, etc.).2
However, as I will argue, this sort of “security”, a service which law enforcement 
agencies are designed and authorized to provide, is a highly elusive concept. Thus, the 
ef¿ cacy of policing, i.e. the process of “creating security” is especially dif¿ cult and 
controversial to establish. For example, in a deeply racist or prejudiced society where 
certain ethnic groups are widely believed to be intrinsically associated with criminality, say 
the Roma in Central East Europe, the police may feel, believe and even claim that they are 
doing what the white middle class majority taxpayers want them to do, therefore they are 
providing “security” if they pull over or stop and search all or many of the Roma they see. 
Law enforcement-related prejudices against minorities are extremely widespread. As we 
often hear, the majority of the prison population is Black (Roma, etc.),3 and almost all of 
the terrorists are Muslim fundamentalists (mostly from Arab countries). Accordingly, 
appropriate restriction of the circle of suspects seems easily justi¿ able. For example, in 
Hungary, according to a survey in 2006, almost two-thirds (62%) of the Hungarian adult 
population agreed fully or to some degree with the claim: “the tendency to commit crime is 
in the nature of the Roma”.4 A 1997 survey by the Ministry of Interior showed that 54% of 
2 As spelled out in ECRI’s General Policy Recommendation No. 11 on Combating Racism and 
Racial Discrimination in Policing, beyond considerations relating to the individual rights affected, the 
harm criterion should be understood in more general terms, as including considerations on the extent 
to which the measure in question institutionalises prejudice and legitimises discriminatory behaviour 
among the general public towards members of certain groups. 
3 In Hungary, a research was published in the mid-’90s revealing estimates on the ratio of Roma 
inmates, which showed that based on self-de¿ nition of inmates about 40% of the prison population is 
Roma (see Huszár, L.: Romák, börtönök, statisztikák (Roma, prisons, statistics). Amaro Drom, 1997 
August, 9–11), with prison directors giving much higher estimates, an average of 60%. Women 
Integration and Prison Project (MIP). Hungarian report “Data on Crime, Judicial and Prison data” 
2004. http://mip.surt.org/ Unpublished)
4 See http://www.tarki.hu/kozvelemeny/kitekint/20060201.html (02.10.2006)
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the police perceived criminality as a central element of Roma identity5 and in 2002–2003, 
the Hungarian Helsinki Committee carried out a research on discrimination against Roma 
in the criminal justice system, ¿ nding deep-running traces of racial pro¿ ling by the police 
within Roma communities.6 Also, it is a general feature of post-9/11 developments in law 
that when anti-terrorist law enforcement measures are involved, a substantially empty 
rhetoric–the inherently false dichotomy of the “liberty vs. security”-binary–has been 
adopted, and with a sweeping move, it has been extended to crime-, and immigration 
control. 
The uniqueness of this New World is, thus, twofold. First, new standards have been set 
up (required and accepted) for government activism in the sphere of curtailing freedom as 
an exchange for security. People (the political class, the electorate) appear to be willing to 
reformulate the traditional balance between liberty and security: a little bit more documents 
and ID-checks, longer lines and more À exible search–warrants seem an acceptable tax 
levied in return for more stringent demands for government-provided security. For example, 
once being convinced that we actually need to be searched and subjected to surveillance for 
aviation safety, and for a faster process, we are willing to giving up some if our privacy and 
enter a full body scanner. It seems to be the case that there is broad consensus on the fact 
that traditional policing principles or, for that matter, the law of the Geneva Conventions 
(regulating the interrogation of prisoners of war, for example) have become unsuited for 
handling the peculiar warfare put on by suicide bombers and terrorist organizations. Just 
about everywhere in the world, the war against terrorism has had the effect of widening the 
control functions of the national security and immigration services, as well as of other law 
enforcement authorities. The expanded measures and procedures thus introduced were often 
ones that legislators and law enforcement of¿ cials otherwise only had dreamed of attaining, 
but this time around, they could take advantage of changes in the public sentiment due to 
society’s shock over the tragic events and fear spreading in their wake. For example, there 
are certain regulations with respect to banking (and clients’ data) that the authorities have 
been longing for, to aid them in their ¿ ght against drugs and organized crime, but beforehand 
they were unable to attain them due to constitutional misgivings. Under the auspices of 
anti-terrorist action, all of a sudden, the same regulations become acceptable. Likewise, 
recent decades saw the prospects of police patrolling based on discriminatory racial pro¿ ling 
fail miserably within the Anglo-American world. All the same, the Arab population became 
a natural target of the war against terrorism. It looks as though the horri¿ c image of weapons 
of mass destruction and recurring terrorist attacks have overwritten the previously held 
principle that it is better to have nine criminals go free than to have a single innocent person 
punished. What we thus see is that the rhetoric of exceptionalism (that is, the acceptance 
that in these special, desperate times, special, desperate measures are needed, and for now 
we can and should put aside the traditional decision-making rules of thumb) is also 
sweeping: it is not limited to the “war against terrorism”, but is utilized in immigration 
policies, and for example in the American criminal policies on sex offenders which 
completely overturn the long-held classic rules of punishment, but it also seen in the general 
5 Csepeli, G.–Orkény, A.–Székelyi, M.: Szertelen módszerek (Insubstantial methods). In: 
Csányi, G. (ed.): SzöveggyĦjtemény a kisebbségi ügyek rendĘrségi kezelésének tanulmányozásához 
(A reader for the study of policing minorities). Budapest, 1997, 130–173.
6 See Farkas, L.–Kézdi, G.–Loss, S.–Zádori, Zs.: A rendĘrség etnikai pro¿ lalkotásának mai 
gyakorlata (The current police practice of ethnic pro¿ ling). Belügyi Szemle, 52 (2004) 2–3, 30–50.
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trends of shifting to post-crime and risk societies. A further unique feature concerns the role 
of the private sector: it becomes both a victim and a willingly cooperating perpetrator in 
this process: it is charged with carrying out a number tasks in control and surveillance (or 
even in the design of privacy-protection enhancing mechanisms against the very risk itself 
poses on privacy), but this also creates a lucrative business opportunity. As an addition 
ironic twist: people seem willing to provide crucial and vast amounts of data to private 
companies in return for commercial services, unaware that due to outsourced state control 
functions these will end up in the hands of the government–only making it obvious that, 
despite the discrepancy of the applicable legal framework, in the ¿ eld of surveillance and 
control, the “public-private” distinction is completely outdated.
This tendency may be alarming for many, but one can easily say that if this New 
Security Deal is passed within the habitual pathways of constitutional participatory 
democracy, there probably is not too much room for complaints against a unanimously 
empowered protective state. After all, the state is theoretically reconstructed as the outcome 
of a notional social contract in which individuals agree to trade a quotient of their liberty in 
exchange for the state’s guardianship of security7 in the broad sense.8 The other apparent 
specialty of this new era, however, is more problematic: the concept of security, which is 
thus positioned centrally in the political, legal and social discourse does not seem to receive 
the degree of scrutiny its weight and relevance would require. In other words, not only is 
“security” a buzz-word for budgetary and policy demands that can easily overrule long-
standing constitutional and human rights limits for government power, but while willingly 
giving in to these demands, we do not even seem to investigate the actual effectiveness of 
many of these measures, for example, whether they actually provide us security (in exchange 
for the liberty value offered).
In other words, at least two separate discussions are going on in the “security vs. 
liberty” debate: a theoretical and a practical one. The theoretical is centred around the 
reformulation of the traditional “security-liberty” balance-recipe. The other line of inquiry 
focuses on the actual practical effectiveness of certain political and legal measures the 
government and law enforcement agencies are allowed to have. 
In this article, through the case study of ethno-racial pro¿ ling, a speci¿ c law 
enforcement action and a potentially structural human rights risk involved, I will provide 
some additional arguments to the second debate. I will highlight the importance of de¿ ning 
and testing the security-content of all new government powers before and during the 
balancing of how much liberty this security is worth. The underlying thesis is that “security” 
is not an objectively determined social condition, but a socio-psychological construction 
inÀ uenced by a number of irrational features and it is subject to both intentional and 
7 According to Ian Loader, the politics of resources or the politics of allocation is concerned 
with trying to ensure that all citizens are provided with a “fair” share of available policing goods; 
something that requires attention both to the unwarranted “over” (or overly invasive) policing of 
particular individuals or social groups, and to the inability of (disadvantaged) citizens and communities 
to acquire a proportionate level of such goods. See Loader, I.: Policing, Securitization and 
Democratization in Europe. Monday 18 April 2005, http://www.libertysecurity.org/article209.
html?var_recherche=policing%2C%20securitization 
8 See, for example Loader, I.: Necessary Virtues: The Legitimate Place of the State in the 
Production of Security. 19 April 2005, 
http://www.libertysecurity.org/article232.html?var_recherche=necessary%20virtues
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circumstantial manipulation. I will argue that “ef¿ ciency” will have both an objective 
dimension, on which lawmakers and judges can and should rely, but it will also have a 
subjective, psychological element, which also needs to be factored into our discussions, 
because fear and prejudice may indeed make certain policies ef¿ cient by the social 
psychological effect it may have on people, even if it turns preconceptions and prejudices 
into a self-ful¿ lling law enforcement prophecy.
I. The objective and subjective aspects of “security”
In the foregoing, it has been demonstrated how important the de¿ nition and measurement 
of security should be in law enforcement, for it is on these that both the pragmatic and 
political success, as well as the constitutionality of law enforcement measures depend. But 
easier said then done. Due to the overrepresentation of crime and violence in media and 
the entertainment and infotainment-business, the public usually vastly overestimates both 
the crime problem in general, and the actual probability of one’s criminal and especially 
violent criminal victimization. While in their reports about crime and security in general, 
high-end newspapers are trying to be factual and analytical, tabloid media tend to be 
anything but restrained. As David Green put it: “Broadsheets tend to focus on government, 
quoting professional experts, elites and interest group representatives. The tabloids tend to 
focus on crime victims and their relatives, offering dramatic testimonials as counterpoint 
to the more professionalized discourse of the broadsheet press”.9 Thus, tabloid readers tend 
to be more fearful of crime than broadsheet readers, particularly about being mugged or 
physically attacked. For example, results from a British Crime Survey (BCS) indicated 
that tabloid readers were almost twice as likely as broadsheet readers to believe crime had 
“increased a lot” over the last several years–43 versus 26%–when it had actually 
declined.10 
Take, for example, the widely held belief (depicted in so many movies and novels) that 
the job of an American police of¿ cer is dangerous. But, as Roger Roots11 points out, police 
work’s billing as a dangerous profession plummets in credibility when viewed from a 
broader perspective. According to the National Institute for Occupational Safety and 
Health,12 it is true that homicide is the second leading cause of death on the job for all 
American workers, however, the taxicab industry suffers homicide rates almost six times 
higher than the police and detective industry. A police of¿ cer’s death on the job is almost as 
likely to be from an accident as from homicide, since approximately 40% of police deaths 
are due to accidents. When overall rates of injury and death on the job are examined, 
policing barely ranks at all. The highest rates of fatal workplace injuries occur in the mining 
9 Green, D. A.: Public opinion versus public judgment about crime. Correcting the “Comedy of 
Errors”. British Journal of Criminology, 46 (2006) 1, 139.
10 Green: op. cit. 138.
11 Roots, R.: Are Cops Constitutional? Seton Hall Constitutional Law Journal, Summer, 11 
(2001), 686–757.
12 National Institute for Occupational Safety and Health, Violence in the Work Place, June 1997. 
National Institute for Occupational Safety and Health, Fatal Injuries to Workers in the United States, 
1980–1989: A Decade of Surveillance, National Pro¿ le, August, 1993 DHHS (NIOSH) Publication 
No. 93–108.
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and construction industries, with transportation, manufacturing and agriculture following 
close behind. A full 98% of all fatal workplace injuries occur in the civilian labour force.13 
The above example shows that it lies within the nature of the concept of “security” that 
due attention needs to be given to the actual veri¿ cation of security risks and the effectiveness 
of the offered security measures in exchange for which we are willing to offer some of our 
rights and liberties. For instance, take the case of ID cards: not only can terrorists use a 
wide range of techniques to forge identities, a recent report by Privacy International showed 
that two-thirds of all terrorists in history have operated under their true identity,14 thus, 
identity cards would have little preventative effect. Nevertheless, one hundred countries 
around the world currently use national identi¿ cation cards,15 and (despite concerns raised 
by privacy advocates) a number of governments are promoting it as a powerful tool to 
prevent and ¿ ght terrorism.16
Following Rob Allan’s remark,17 David Green18 calls it something of a “comedy of 
errors” in which policy and practice are not based on a proper understanding of public 
opinion, which is, in turn, not based on a proper understanding of policy and practice.19 The 
process of securitization,20 a core concept in contemporary socio-political developments, is 
13 Roots: op. cit. 711–712. Also, note that about 2% of American soldiers serving in South 
Vietnam during the Vietnam War died during their service there, yet most Americans would view a 
one-year tour of duty in South Vietnam during that war as a grave danger. Amitai Aviram, The Placebo 
Effect of Law: Law’s Role In Manipulating Perceptions George Washington Law Review, November, 
2006, footnote 80.
14 Privacy Int’l, Mistaken Identity; Exploring the Relationship Between National Identity Cards 
& the Prevention of Terrorism 2 (2004). The report also shows that “[a]t a theoretical level, a national 
identity card as outlined by the UK government – the proposed legislation in question – could only 
assist anti-terrorism efforts if it was used by a terrorist who was eligible and willing to register for 
one, if the person was using their true identity, and if intelligence data could be connected to that 
identity”. See http://www.privacyinternational.org/issues/idcard/UK/ id-terrorism.pdf  
15 See Davies, S.: Identity Cards: Frequently Asked Questions, Privacy Int’l, Aug. 24, 1996, 
http:// www.privacy.org/pi/activities/idcard/idcard_faq.html
16 Jennifer Morris, Big Success or “Big Brother”? Great Britain’s National Identi¿ cation Scheme 
Before The European Court Of Human Rights. Georgia Journal Of International And Comparative 
Law, Winter 2008, 471.
17 Allen, R.: “There Must Be Some Way of Dealing with Kids”: Young Offenders, Public 
Attitudes and Policy Change. Youth Justice, 2 (2002) 1, 3–13.
18 Green: op. cit. 132.
19 It needs to be noted that it may very well fall within the interest of politicians to rely on 
unsubstantiated public opinion. For example (see Green: op. cit. 137), following a high pro¿ le murder 
case, the then Shadow Home Secretary, Tony Blair wrote a piece in The Sun asserting, “[w]e can 
debate the crime rate statistics until the cows come home. The Home Of¿ ce says crime is falling. 
Others say it isn’t. I say crime, like economic recovery, is something that politicians cannot persuade 
people about one way or another. People know because they experience it. They do not need to be 
told. And they know crime is rising”. Blair’s comments imply that there is no substitute for experience, 
even secondhand, mass-mediated experience, and his piece lent unquali¿ ed credibility to tabloid 
portrayals. He as much as told the public that their fear of crime, irrational or not, is more important 
than any unbiased assessment of the problem.
20 According to the constructivist “Copenhagen School” of security analysis, securitization is 
constituted by the intersubjective establishment of an existential threat with a saliency suf¿ cient to 
have substantial political effects. The semiotic structure of securitization differentiates between 
“referent objects”, “securitizing actors” and “functional actors”. A “referent object” of securitization 
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intertwined with a number of institutional, political and bureaucratic interests, and the entire 
avalanche is based on perception rather than on objective features. The irony of the case is 
that no efforts are required from governments to try to assess how certain institutions or law 
enforcement measures will affect the actual risk of criminal or terrorist involvement, or 
even risk-perception. Thus, the state is under no pressure or obligation to prove the 
correlation between the increase in (the perception of) security–which is in most cases only 
assumed, presumed and forecasted. Presumably, a lack of a proper methodology to test such 
dynamics lies behind the fact that the public seems to accept “risk prevention” as a proper 
price to be paid for extended law enforcement authorizations, and social risks are not 
weighted against the potential bene¿ ts. “Prevention of terrorist attacks” appears to be a 
blank check, where we are waiving our rights to actually control the effectiveness of the 
preventive measures. If no terrorist attack happens, the government may argue that is 
exactly due to these preventive commitments that we could have escaped the threatening 
disasters. If such incidents do take place in our approximate or remote distance, it is even 
more a reason to strengthen government efforts and establish further law enforcement 
measures. 
According to Peter Lock “Though once being upgraded to ‘war’, anti-terrorism 
becomes an open-ended activity because it is intrinsically impossible to de¿ ne criteria 
which would unequivocally permit the declaration of victory and put an end to this war. 
The institutions charged with carrying out the ‘war against terrorism’ emerge as powerful 
bureaucracies with their own corporate agendas. They are often capable of evading 
parliamentary oversight. It plays to their advantage in their drive to achieve dominant 
positions in the state apparatus that many of their activities are shielded from scrutiny for 
asserted operational reasons. Their claims of effectiveness cannot be measured as the full 
dimension of their task is by de¿ nition unknown as long as the unbounded concept of 
terrorism rules political discourses. Their persistent exigency that they must be entitled to 
carry out covert operations at their own discretion is inherently dif¿ cult to monitor. 
Confronted with imagined terrorism as opposed to de¿ ned political challenges in a populist 
political climate elected bodies are not inclined suf¿ ciently challenge the agendas of the 
institutional security network. The executive is capable of launching a dynamic of circular 
causation by imaging a hypothetical terror network, which is delineated as invisible (and 
hence unknowable). Politicians are not inclined to take risks and do not de¿ ne how much 
production of alleged security is enough. As a result, measures adopted in the ¿ ght against 
terrorism acquire features of self-ful¿ lling prophecies. … In such a context it is virtually 
impossible to measure progress in the ¿ ght against terrorism”.21 Commentators point out 
that fear also plays a noticeable role in generating identity and feeling of belonging, and 
is something that is considered to be existentially threatened. In the vast majority of cases the security 
referent is the state, and the “securitizing actor” is the actor who actually performs the speech act of 
securitization, by declaring the referent object “existentially threatened”, whereas a “functional actor” 
is a participant in carrying out the pragmatic consequences of securitization. Security is never 
objectively given and there is no implicit, objective or given relation between the subject–the security 
actor–and the object of securitization as this relation is constructed intersubjectively through social 
relations and processes. See Burgess, P.: The Ethical Subject of Security. Tuesday 10 May 2005,
http://www.libertysecurity.org/article248.html?var_recherche=ethical%20subject
21 Lock, P.: Anti-terrorism and Effects on Freedom of Movement-Assessing the Concept of 
Progress in the Fight against Terrorism. Wednesday 20 July 2005,
http://www.libertysecurity.org/article318.html?var_recherche=lock%20peter
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collective insecurity can be understood as the purest form of community belonging. The 
“dangerization process” facilitates an increasing culture of defence. The security discourse 
serves as an effective means to stimulate community belonging, and is an effective vehicle 
of post-industrial political power.22
The irony of the case is that inspired by the academic discipline of law and economics, 
in the past years, a considerable body of literature has focused on estimating the social costs 
of crime and crime prevention–only these ¿ ndings have not seem to have made the desirable 
impact on public policy and discourse. For example, Paul Dolan and Tessa Peasgood 
developed a methodology to provide estimates of the intangible costs arising from the 
anticipation of possible victimization; that is, estimates of the costs of fear of crime.23 These 
costs are categorised according to whether they result in non-health-related losses or health-
related losses. When people feel that they may be about to become a victim of crime, they 
will experience anxiety and stress. The frequency with which people are in this state and 
the intensity of the anxiety is one measure of the health-related loss from anticipated crime. 
Non-health losses are associated with changes in behaviour (where for example people use 
their own cars or take taxis rather than walk or use public transport because of their fear of 
crime)24 and/or changes in how society is viewed. 
For example, a survey of public attitudes to quality of life in the United Kingdom in 
2001 found that crime was mentioned by 24% of respondents as an important factor 
affecting quality of life, which made crime the third largest factor after money and health.25 
They claim that the direct costs of security measures, insurance administration expenditure 
and costs incurred from crime-averting behaviour can be interpreted as revealing people’s 
preferences to reduce the risks of victimization and the worry about victimization. Also, a 
further tangible cost attributable to anticipating crime is any loss in productivity caused by 
the time and energy spent on actions and emotions linked to anticipating possible 
victimization. This may include leaving work early to avoid walking home alone, or time 
spent dealing with a burglar alarm that has been accidentally set off.26 In addition to these, 
other behavioural changes also involve additional time costs. Based on survey observations 
in the United States, on average, an adult spends two minutes locking and unlocking doors 
each day and just over two minutes a day looking for keys, which is valued at $437 per 
year.27 It means that U.S. citizens are estimated to spend nearly $90 billion worth of time 
each year simply locking their doors and searching for their keys.28
22 See Lianos, M.: Hegemonic Security Discourse: Late Modernity’s Grand Narrative. Tuesday 
6 September 2005, http://www.libertysecurity.org/article386.html?var_recherche=michalis
23 See Dolan, P.–Peasgood, T.: Estimating the Economic and Social Costs of the Fear of Crime. 
British Journal of Criminology, 41 (2007) 1, 121–132.
24 It needs to be added that more expensive forms of transport clearly bring other bene¿ ts, such 




27 A study found an average willingness to pay to avoid locking or unlocking assets of $804 
(from a sample of 140 respondents). The extra time taken walking home to avoid potentially dangerous 
shortcuts could, in principle, be valued in a similar way. Ibid. 124.
28 Anderson, D. A.: The Aggregate Burden of Crime, Journal of Law and Economics, 42 (1999) 
2, 611, 623–24.
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It needs to be added that according to estimates, citizens of the United States spend 
more on private precautions–“estimates range from $160 billion to $300 billion per year–
than on the entire public law enforcement budget. That is, citizens spend more on locks, 
neighbourhood watches, and the like than U.S. governments (state and federal) spend on 
police, judges, prosecutors, prisons, and prison guards”.29
This leads us back to the question of available information. Media theory frequently 
refers to the concept of cultivation. According to this, television is society’s storyteller and 
if a viewer sees a great deal of violence on television, then she will presume that society is 
violent; once this presumption takes root, it can penetrate the viewer’s attitudinal base and 
become a decision-making factor. Hence, a viewer who believes that society is violent may 
be more afraid to walk alone at night, inclined to purchase a home alarm system, or likely 
to support increasing the police force.30 It is well documented in criminology that individual 
risk predictions are largely based on interpretations far removed from rational considerations 
of likelihood based on recorded crime rates.31 Far more people believe that they will become 
future victims of a given offence than the number of those who actually become victims. 
For example, respondents in three waves of a longitudinal crime survey conducted in 
Trinidad believed that they are “likely” or “very likely” to be murdered in the following 
12 months at each of three times at which the sample was questioned. In fact, in 1999, 120 
murders were recorded in the population of 1.3 million, that is: 99.8% of those 585,000 
expecting to die erred on the question.32 
To sum up, not only is security an elusive and subjective concept, but most preventive 
measures will also defy objective veri¿ cation. In light of these, let us now turn to the case 
study of ethno-racial33 pro¿ ling.
29 Mikos, R. A.: “Eggshell” Victims, Private Precautions, and the Societal bene¿ ts of shifting 
crime. Michigan Law Review, 105 (2006) 2, 308. The author also draws attention to the fact that 
literature supports the claim that many of the resources spent in the private war on crime are being 
wasted because many private precautions only shift crime onto other, less guarded citizens, and this 
redistribution of crime has no net social bene¿ t, as precautions that only shift crime constitute rent-
seeking behavior: individuals expend resources to transfer losses, without reducing the size of those 
losses. A typical example would be vehicle anti-theft devices which will urge thieves to target other 
cars but not deter them from stealing. A similar discussion centers on the question of gated 
communities, which are also found only to divert crime to other communities. (As of 2003, there were 
nearly seven million households located in gated communities in the US, which adds up to 7% of all 
households.) It is for this reason that some local governments have simply refused to allow real estate 
developers to control access to new or existing communities. See Mikos: op. cit. 309, 315, 319.
30 Podlas, K.: The “CSI Effect” and other Forensic Fictions. Loyola of Los Angeles Entertainment 
Law Review, 27 (2006–2007) 2, 98–99. The author notes that cultivation is rooted more in media 
theory than psychology and that according to other research, media content merely makes the audience 
aware of an issue (the agenda-setting effect); at other times, it reinforces pre-existing attitudes; at still 
others, it seems to have no impact on values or direction of response whatsoever. Podlas: op. cit. 
101–103.
31 See for example Chadee, D.–Austen, L.–Ditton, J.: The Relationship Between Likelihood and 
Fear of Criminal Victimization. British Journal of Criminology, 47 (2007) 1, 133–153.
32 Ibid. 133, 134.
33 Despite obvious differences in the terms, throughout this article the two will be used 
interchangeably.
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II. Ethnic profi ling: the concept and its practice
In what follows, I will delineate the general practice of ethnic34 pro¿ ling and ethnicity-
based selection, and how these arise in the context of the ¿ ght against terrorism. In the 
pro¿ ling process terror-suspects, ethnic, racial, national or religious minorities, immigrants, 
indigenous or poor people are interchangeable. I will argue that besides the perennial 
problem with ethnic pro¿ ling–that it readily turns into a form of ethnic discrimination–it 
faces an independent problem: lack of effectiveness. 
There is not one universally accepted and utilized de¿ nition for pro¿ ling. Pro¿ ling in 
the abstract sense refers to identifying information, making predictions and, ¿ nally, 
inference.35 The word “pro¿ le” (pro¿ l in French) was originally used in the artistic ¿ eld. It 
denoted the outlines and features of a face seen from one side or, more broadly, the portrayal 
of an object seen from one side only. Historically, the term “pro¿ ling” in law enforcement 
¿ rst came to prominence in connection with the training of crime pro¿ lers in the USA. In 
theory, these people are supposed to be capable of determining a criminal’s personality type 
by analysing traces left at the scene of the crime. In any abstract pro¿ ling operation, three 
stages may be identi¿ ed: The ¿ rst stage is “observation”, often referred to as data 
warehousing, where personal or anonymous data are collated. If the data refer to an 
identi¿ able or identi¿ ed individual, they will generally be anonymised during this stage. 
The collected data may be of internal or external origin. For example, a bank might draw up 
an anonymous list of its customers who are bad payers, together with their characteristics, 
or a marketing ¿ rm might acquire a list of the major supermarket chains’ “shopping baskets” 
without the shoppers being identi¿ ed. This ¿ rst stage is followed by a second set of 
operations, usually referred to as data mining, which is carried out by statistical methods 
and whose purpose is to establish, with a certain margin of error, correlations between 
certain observable variables. For instance, a bank might establish a statistical link between a 
long stay abroad and one or more missed loan repayments. The concrete outcome of this 
stage is a mechanism whereby individuals are categorised on the basis of some of their 
observable characteristics in order to infer, with a certain margin of error, others that are not 
observable. The third and last stage, known as “inference”, consists in applying the 
mechanism described above in order to be able to infer, on the basis of data relating to an 
identi¿ ed or identi¿ able person, new data which are in fact those of the category to which 
he or she belongs. Very often, only this last operation is referred to as “pro¿ ling”, it, 
however, is essential, to see this ¿ nal stage as part of a process.36
Recent developments in information technology, however, make today’s pro¿ ling 
activities increasingly easy and sophisticated, thus the possibilities offered by pro¿ ling are 
numerous and cover different areas of application. For example, in the USA, ATS 
(Automated Targeting System) has been developed in order to evaluate the probability of a 
34 A note about terminology: besides obvious differences, I will treat racial, ethnic and 
nationality-based terminology as synonymous.
35 Dinant, J.-M.–Lazaro, Ch.–Poullet, Y.–Lefever, N.–Rouvroy, A.: Application of Convention 
108 to the pro¿ ling mechanism. Some ideas for the future work of the consultative committee. 
Consultative Committee of the Convention for the Protection of Individuals with regard to Automatic 
Processing of Personal Data (T-Pd), 24th meeting, 13–14 March 2008, Strasbourg, G01 (T-PD). 
Secretariat document prepared by the Council of Europe Directorate General of Human Rights and 
Legal Affairs, Strasbourg, 11 January 2008 T-PD(2008)01, 4–11.
36 Ibid. 3.
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given individual being a terrorist. Also, data mining is an extremely valuable tool in the 
area of marketing and customer management. It is one means of moving from mass 
marketing to genuinely personalized marketing. Data mining can be de¿ ned as the 
application of statistical, data-analysis and arti¿ cial-intelligence techniques to the 
exploration and analysis with no preconceived ideas of (often large) computer data bases in 
order to extract fresh information that may be of use to the holder of these data. In other 
words, the value of data mining is that it is an IT tool which can “make the data talk”. 
Generally speaking, the methods on which data mining is based can be divided into two 
categories: some are descriptive and others predictive, depending on whether the aim is to 
explain or predict a “target” variable. Descriptive methods are used to bring out information 
that is present but hidden within the mass of data, while predictive methods are used to 
exploit a set of observed and documented events in order to try and predict the development 
of an activity by drawing projection curves. This method can be applied to the management 
of customer relations in order to predict a customer’s behaviour.37 The aim is for example to 
determine the pro¿ le of individuals with a high purchasing probability or to predict when a 
customer will become disloyal. Likewise, pro¿ ling is widely used in the ¿ eld of risk 
management, when determining the characteristics of high-risk customers. Such aims may 
include the adjustment of insurance premiums; prevention of arrears; aid to payment 
decisions where current account overdrafts exceed the authorized limit in the banking 
sector; use of a risk “score” in order to offer individual customers the most appropriate loan 
or refuse a loan depending on the probability of honouring repayment deadlines and the 
terms of the contract, etc. Cable digital TV provides programme distributors with precise 
information regarding channel selection and channel hopping by viewers who receive 
television channels via their telephone cable by means of DSL technology. They can thus 
create and keep a perfectly accurate viewing pro¿ le for each user. It therefore becomes 
technically possible to tailor advertisements to the user’s pro¿ le. Also, a similar methodology 
is used by Google’s on-line advertising system, where user’s click stream is monitored. In 
the age of strategic marketing, pro¿ ling and data mining is used in creating packages and 
special offers; designing new products and customer loyalty policy.
The Consultative Committee of the Convention for the Protection of Individuals with 
regard to Automatic Processing of Personal Data de¿ ned pro¿ ling as a computerised method 
involving data mining from data warehouses, which makes it possible, or should make it 
possible, to place individuals, with a certain degree of probability, and hence with a certain 
induced error rate, in a particular category in order to take individual decisions relating to 
them. This concept of pro¿ ling differs from criminal pro¿ ling, where the aim is to get inside 
and understand the criminal’s mind, but is similar to behavioural analysis since the aim is 
not to understand the motives which lead or might lead an individual to adopt a given 
behaviour, but to establish a strong mathematical correlation between certain characteristics 
that the individual shares with other “similar” individuals and a given behaviour which one 
wishes to predict or inÀ uence. As this approach does not depend on human intelligence, but 
on statistical analysis of masses of ¿ gures relating to observations converted to digital form, 
it can be carried out by means of a computer with minimum human intervention.
Thus, pro¿ ling (i) can be applied in a number of contexts, that can vary from the 
commercial sector to the ¿ eld of law enforcement; (ii) it is a mechanism where the task is to 
narrow down the circle of potential individuals that may fall within the scope of activities 
37 Ibid. 8–9.
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of a particular agent within the given ¿ eld: it may involve identifying a group of customers 
or potential perpetrators; (iii) pro¿ ling will always include certain characteristics upon 
which the process relies; and (iv) there will always be a scheme of reasoning according to 
which these characteristics and the way in which they are employed are established. 
In 2002, the EU’s Working Party on Terrorism drew up recommendations for member 
states on the use of “terrorist pro¿ ling”, and de¿ ned it as using “a set of physical, 
psychological, or behavioural variables, which have been identi¿ ed as typical of persons 
involved in terrorist activities and which may have some predictive value in that respect”.38 
According to Rebekah Delsol,39 racial pro¿ ling refers to the use by the police of 
generalisations based on race, ethnicity, religion or national origin, rather than individual 
behaviour, speci¿ c suspect descriptions or accumulated intelligence, as the basis for 
suspicion in directing discretionary law enforcement actions such as stops, identity checks, 
questioning, or searches among other tactics. Speci¿ c de¿ nitions of racial or ethnic pro¿ ling 
vary along a continuum ranging from the use of race alone as the reason for the stop to 
those using race along with other factors as the reason for the stop.40
Using a narrow de¿ nition, racial pro¿ ling occurs when a police of¿ cer stops, questions, 
arrests and/or searches someone solely on the basis of a person’s race or ethnicity. A broader 
de¿ nition acknowledges that race may be used as one of several factors involved in an 
of¿ cer’s decision to stop someone. A stop is likely to be made on the conÀ uence of several 
factors such as race or ethnicity along with age, dress (hooded sweatshirts, baggy trousers, 
perceived gang dress, etc.), time of the day, geography (looking “out of place” in a 
neighbourhood or being in a designated “high-crime area”). This de¿ nition reÀ ects the fact 
that racial pro¿ ling may be caused by the purposefully racist behaviour of individual 
of¿ cers, or the cumulative effect of the unconscious use of racist stereotypes, but may also 
result from institutional factors, such as the use of enforcement techniques and deployment 
patterns, which impact on ethnic groups unequally.41
Pro¿ ling can take place in other stops or contacts with the public by any type of law 
enforcement of¿ cer or other authorities such as traf¿ c stops in cities as well as highways, 
stopping and questioning of pedestrians in public places in urban areas, sweeps of trains 
and buses, immigration status checks by immigration of¿ cials, and airport security and 
customs checks or searches. Patterns of pro¿ ling can also be seen in discriminatory 
treatment after a stop has taken place, such as black motorists being given traf¿ c citations 
while white motorists are let off with a warning, or Latin/o/a youth, but not white youth, 
being cited for noise violations, mass controls in public places, stop and search and identity 
checks, data mining and raids on places of worship, businesses and organisations.42
Thus, ethnic or racial pro¿ ling, that is pro¿ ling that includes race and ethnicity as one 
of the characteristics involved in the process, is a practice that relies on the tenet that 
ethnicity in itself signals a certain type of criminal involvement, terrorist plotting or illegal 
border crossing as more likely, and this assumption serves as a suf¿ cient and therefore 
38 See Hayes, B.: A Failure to regulate: Data protection and Ethnic Pro¿ ling in the Police Sector 
in Europe. Justice Initiatives. Justice initiatives. June 2005, 37.
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legitimate basis for law enforcement (police, secret service, etc.) suspicion. The peculiarity 
of pro¿ ling lies in the fact that it is not based on illegal behaviour, but is centred around 
idea to collect legal behavioural patterns or character–traits that may signal criminal 
behaviour–it is therefore based on an assumed correlation between criminality and the 
speci¿ ed characteristics or behavioural patterns, a deduction based on retrospectively judged 
effectiveness, which is always assumed, rather than checked and con¿ rmed.
Thus, stops are not induced by suspicious or illegal behaviour, or by a piece of 
information that would concern the defendant speci¿ cally. Instead, a prediction provides 
grounds for police action: based on the high rate of criminality within the ethnic group or 
its dominant (exclusive) involvement in committing acts of terror, it seems like a rational 
assumption to stop someone on ethnic grounds. Measures are therefore applied not so much 
on the basis of the (suspicious) behaviour of the individual, but based on an aggregate 
reasoning. The goal is to make an ef¿ cient allocation (based on rational interconnections) 
of the limited amount of the available police and security resources. 
Law enforcement pro¿ ling, which mostly takes the form of stop and search, was ¿ rst 
developed in the U.S. for detecting drug couriers, and was later implemented in traf¿ c 
control, and more recently in anti-terror procedures. At the heart of these procedures is the 
idea that the race or ethnicity of the perpetrator serves as a useful tool for the detection of 
criminality. Originally, the procedure of pro¿ ling was aimed at creating a description pro¿ le 
for suspects, in order to help the authorities in ¿ ltering out potential perpetrators based on 
certain sets of (legal) behavior and circumstances. In the case of drug couriers, such a 
characterization might include short stop-overs between signi¿ cant drug sources and the 
distribution location, cash paid for the airline ticket, and, based on criminal statistics, also 
ethnicity, sex and age. The inclusion of ethnicity in the pro¿ le was reasoned by the fact that 
gangs that play key roles in organized crime tend to be almost exclusively ethnically 
homogeneous.
The idea to take race into consideration as a helpful tool to screen offenders was widely 
accepted among law enforcement of¿ cers.43 American studies on highway patrols for 
example have shown that blacks, comprising 12.3% of the American population, are 
signi¿ cantly overrepresented among those stopped and checked by the police.44 In New 
Jersey, between 1994 and 1999, 53% of those stopped by the police were black, 24.1% 
were Hispanic and only 21% were white.45 A study conducted on the Moscow Metro found 
that non-Slavs are on average 21.8 times more likely to be stopped by the police than Slavs 
although they make up only 4.6% of the riders in the Metro system. A 2006 study in 
Bulgaria, Hungary and Spain found that Roma and immigrants in Spain are more likely to 
be stopped on the street for the purpose of identity and immigration checks and once stopped 
are more likely to be treated disrespectfully by police of¿ cers. The report published by the 
43 For example, in 1994, an estimated 2,714,000 juveniles were arrested in the United States. 
Of those juveniles, 25% were black and 62% were white. Black juveniles, however, comprised only 
15% of the total juvenile population, whereas white juveniles comprised 80% of the total juvenile 
population. Garrison, A. H.: Disproportionate Minority Arrest: A Note on What Has Been Said and 
How It Fits Together, New England Journal on Criminal and Civil Con¿ nement. Winter 1997, 32.
44 http://quickfacts.census.gov/qfd/states/00000.html
45 See Buerger, M.–Farrell, A.: The evidence of racial pro¿ ling: interpreting documented and 
unof¿ cial sources. Police Quarterly, 5 (2002) 3, 290; Harris, D. A.: The Stories, the Statistics, and the 
Law: Why “Driving While Black” Matters. Minnesota Law Review, 84 (1999), 267.
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Justice Initiative Program of the Open Society Institute (OSI)46 found that in both Bulgaria 
and Hungary, Roma are about three times more likely than non-Roma to be stopped by 
police and are more likely to report unpleasant experiences. In Germany, racial pro¿ ling has 
been used in the context of the post 9/11 terrorism threats. Between 2001–2003, German 
police undertook a massive data-mining or Rasterfahndung operation to identify potential 
terrorist sleeper cells. As mentioned above, the police collected the personal data of 
approximately 8.3 million people and “trawled” the data using an ethnic pro¿ le that included 
the Muslim religion and nationality or country of birth from a list of 26 states with 
predominantly Muslim populations. The “hits” generated by the database as potential 
terrorists were then singled out for further investigation.
Figures for 2003/2004 showed that in the UK the rate of stop and search for black 
people was nearly six and-a-half times that for whites, while for Asians, the ratio was nearly 
twice that for whites.47 Stephen Humphreys noted that the consistent overrepresentation of 
minorities in United States custodial and correctional facilities is not contested. According 
to of¿ cial Justice Department statistics, more than 60% of federal prisoners in 2002 were 
from minority groups, although they make up only 25% of the population. This ¿ gure, the 
department noted, has been unchanged since 1996. Blacks alone have consistently made up 
44–45% of the prison population since 1995, despite comprising only 12% of the total 
population. By 2002, there were 134,000 more blacks than whites in the country’s prisons, 
despite there being six times as many whites as blacks in the country as a whole. At the 
same time, the prison population has risen relentlessly. Between 1995 and 2002 the total 
number in custody increased by 30% (from 1,585,586 to 2,085,620). Altogether, blacks 
were seven times as likely as whites to be in prison, comprising 56% of all convicted drug 
offenders. According to the U.S. Department of Justice, “Overall, the increasing number of 
drug offenses [to 2001] accounted for 27% of the total growth among black inmates, 7% of 
the total growth among Hispanic inmates, and 15% of the growth among white inmates”. 
Human Rights Watch describes the war on drugs as “devastating to black Americans”, 
partly because it provides the background for ethnic pro¿ ling. In Spain, according to one 
study, about 25% of women in prison are Roma (while constituting only 1.4% of the Spanish 
population). In Italy, foreigners make up some 30% of prisoners.48 In the USA, the targeting 
of minorities for traf¿ c stops became so ubiquitous that it earned its own nick-name: 
“driving while black or brown” or “DWB”– a twist on the crime of driving while intoxicated 
or DWI. 
After the attacks of September 11th 2001, the “war on terror” extended the practice of 
racial pro¿ ling to include Muslims and those perceived to be of Arab or Middle Eastern 
descent. Racial or religious pro¿ ling has been identi¿ ed as occurring through car stops, 
aggressive enforcement of immigration laws and alien registration, intrusive security 
46 Miller, J.–Bernát, A.–DencsĘ, B.–Gounev, P.–Pap, A. L.–Pernas, B.–Simonovits, B.–Wagman, 
D.: “And I can stop and search whoever I want”: Police stops of ethnic minorities in Bulgaria, 
Hungary and Spain. Justice Initiatives, New York, 2007. 
47 Delsol, R.–Shiner, M.: Regulating Stop and Search: A Challenge for Police and Community 
Relations in England and Wales. Critical Criminology, 14 (2006) 3, 241–263. Also, disproportionality 
is greater under powers that do not require reasonable suspicion, such as those for terrorism and 
suspicion of violent crime, indicating that where levels of police discretion are highest, generalisations 
and negative stereotypes play an even greater role.
48 Humphreys, S.: The Case for Monitoring Ethnic Pro¿ ling in Europe. Justice initiatives, June 
2005, 45, 46 and 48.
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screening in airports and removal from planes. Since then, “À ying while Arab” has also 
entered the lexicon of pro¿ ling. 
Justices of the US Supreme Court have also acknowledged the negative impact of 
unregulated police discretion on communities of colour. In his dissent in the mentioned 
United States vs. Martinez-Fuerte-case,49 Justice Brennan predicted that the majority’s 
decision, which permitted the use of Mexican ancestry as a primary factor in checkpoint 
stops to investigate undocumented immigration, would frustrate the Mexican American 
community, and warned “[t]hat deep resentment will be stirred by a sense of unfair 
discrimination is not dif¿ cult to foresee”. Later, in Florida vs. Bostick,50 Justice Marshall’s 
dissent invoked the concern that the police used race as a factor in deciding which 
individuals to target in conducting ostensibly “random” bus sweeps. Justices in Illinois vs. 
Wardlow51 and Atwater vs. City of Lago Vista52 also discussed the impact of increased 
police powers on people of colour who might have legitimate reasons to fear and À ee from 
the police, or who might experience police harassment as a result of enforcement of a minor 
traf¿ c law.53
III. The assessment of profi ling and some empirical fi ndings
As ethno-racial pro¿ ling proliferated, a ¿ erce academic and political debate erupted over 
the issue.54 Criticism of such practices is manifold. Some emphasize that ethnic pro¿ ling is 
in principle unacceptable, because it results in the harassment of the innocent minority 
middle class, which is thus subjected to a kind of “racial tax” that affects all aspects of 
people’s lives. For example, ECRI’s General Policy Recommendation No 11 on Combating 
Racism and Racial Discrimination ¿ nds that racial pro¿ ling constitutes a speci¿ c form of 
racial discrimination. By de¿ ning racial pro¿ ling as the use by the police of certain grounds 
in control, surveillance or investigation activities, without objective and reasonable 
justi¿ cation, it claims that the use of these grounds has no objective and reasonable 
justi¿ cation if it does not pursue a legitimate aim or if there is not a reasonable relationship 
of proportionality between the means employed and the aim sought to be realized. Thus, 
even when, in abstract terms, a legitimate aim exists (for instance the prevention of disorder 
49 428 U.S. 543 (1976)
50 501 U.S. 429 (1991)
51 528 U.S. 119 (2000)
52 532 U.S. 318 (2001)
53 Sinha, P.: Police Use of Race in Suspect Descriptions: Constitutional Considerations. New 
York University Review of Law and Social Change, 31 (2006) 1, 156.
54 Consider, for example the debate surrounding the European Commission’s proposal for a 
European Passenger Name Record (PNR), where the European Parliament has raised repeated 
concerns related to pro¿ ling, in particular regarding race, ethnicity and religion, in the context of data 
protection, law enforcement cooperation, exchange of data and intelligence, aviation and transport 
security, immigration and border management and treatment of minorities. See for example Pap, A. 
L.: Ethnicity- and race-based pro¿ ling in counter-terrorism, law enforcement and border control. Ad-
hoc brie¿ ng paper, Directorate-General Internal Policies, Policy Department C, Citizens Rights and 
Constitutional Affairs, European Parliament, Brussels, November 2008, PE 408.326, or the Working 
Document on problem of pro¿ ling, notably on the basis of ethnicity and race, in counterterrorism, law 
enforcement, immigration, customs and border control by the Committee on Civil Liberties, Justice 
and Home Affairs. Rapporteur: Sarah Ludford, 30.9.2008, DT\745085EN.doc PE413.954v02-00. 
2. and 4. 
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or crime), the use of these grounds in control, surveillance or investigation activities can 
hardly be justi¿ ed outside the case where the police act on the basis of a speci¿ c suspect 
description within the relevant time-limits, i.e. when it pursues a speci¿ c lead concerning 
the identifying characteristics of a person involved in a speci¿ c criminal activity. In order 
for the police to avoid racial pro¿ ling, control, surveillance or investigation activities should 
be strictly based on individual behaviour and/or accumulated intelligence. The notion of 
objective and reasonable justi¿ cation should be interpreted as restrictively as possible with 
respect to differential treatment based on any of the enumerated grounds, thus different 
considerations should be taken into account in order to assess whether the proportionality 
test between the means employed and the aims sought to be realized is satis¿ ed in the 
context of racial pro¿ ling. The Recommendation notes that in the same way as racial 
discrimination, racial pro¿ ling can take the form of indirect racial discrimination. In other 
words, the police may use (without objective and reasonable justi¿ cation) criteria which are 
apparently neutral, but impact disproportionately on a group of persons designated by 
grounds such as race, colour, language, religion, nationality or national or ethnic origin. For 
instance, a pro¿ le that tells the police to stop all women who wear a headscarf could 
constitute racial pro¿ ling inasmuch as it would impact disproportionately on Muslim women 
and would not have an objective and reasonable justi¿ cation. The prohibition of racial 
pro¿ ling should also cover these indirect forms of racial pro¿ ling. Furthermore, the 
Recommendation notes that in the same way as racial discrimination, racial pro¿ ling can 
take the form of discrimination by association. This occurs when a person is discriminated 
against on the basis of his or her association or contacts with persons designated by one of 
the grounds mentioned above.55
In its General Recommendation XXXI on the prevention of racial discrimination in the 
administration and functioning of the criminal justice system (2005), the Committee for the 
Elimination of Racial Discrimination also held that ethnic pro¿ ling constitutes per se a form 
of racial discrimination. In line with this, the EU Network of Independent Experts on 
Fundamental Rights56 draw attention to the fact in its opinion 2006/4 that the use of “racial” 
or ethnic characteristics as part of a set of factors that are systematically associated with 
particular offences and used as a basis for making law enforcement decisions is clearly 
discriminatory, not only because of the absence of any proven statistically signi¿ cant 
correlation between indicators linked to race or ethnicity, religion or national origin, on the 
one hand, and propensity to commit certain criminal offences on the other hand, but also 
because the principle of non-discrimination requires that only in exceptional circumstances 
should the race or ethnicity, the religion or the nationality of a person, inÀ uence the decision 
about how to treat or not to treat that person.57
55 Paras 27–34 and 38.
56 See Opinion 2006/4 on ethnic pro¿ ling.
57 Under the case law of the ECHR, Art. 14 of the European Convention on Human Rights, “no 
difference in treatment which is based exclusively or to a decisive extent on a person’s ethnic origin is 
capable of being objectively justi¿ ed in a contemporary democratic society built on the principles of 
pluralism and respect for different cultures”. ECHR, Timishev v. Russia (no. 55762/00 and 55974/00) 
(2nd section), judgment of 13 December 2005 (¿ nal on 13 March 2006), Para. 58. Also, as concerns 
differential treatment on the ground of nationality, the European Court of Human Rights includes this 
ground among those for which “very weighty reasons” are required in order for differential treatment 
to be justi¿ ed, ECHR, Gaygusuz v. Austria (no. 17371/90), judgment of 16 September 1996, 
Para. 42.
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The Network’s opinion demonstrates that European case-law is somewhat uneven in 
the matter: For example, in the United Kingdom, by the House of Lords in R (on the 
application of European Roma Rights Centre) vs. Immigration Of¿ cer at Prague Airport58 
immigration of¿ cers operating at Prague Airport were held to have discriminated on racial 
grounds–contrary to the Race Relations Act 1976, Sec. 1(1)(a)–against Roma seeking to 
travel from that airport to the United Kingdom by treating them more sceptically than non-
Roma when determining whether to grant them leave to enter the United Kingdom. The 
decision was in stark contrast to a judgment passed by the Second Chamber of the Spanish 
Constitutional Court on 29 January 2001.59 Here the Court took the view that the arrest of a 
woman in a train station, in order to identify her and to control the legality of her 
administrative situation, could not be considered discriminatory, although she was dark-
skinned. The woman concerned was an African-American of naturalized Spanish citizenship. 
The identity check by the police took place upon her leaving a train. She had no identity 
documents with her but assured the police that she was of Spanish nationality, and that the 
documents were at her home. She was travelling with her husband, who was white and was 
not checked. In contrast to this position, a complaint for discrimination ¿ led in similar 
circumstances did succeed before the Austrian Constitutional Court.60 An Austrian citizen 
born in Ghana and her four-year-old daughter travelled by train from the Netherlands to 
Austria. During the train ride her luggage was controlled by law enforcement of¿ cers 
without any result. After arriving in Vienna she was controlled a second time without any 
result and had to declare her consent to an X-ray examination, which passed also without 
any result. The woman submitted a complaint to the Independent Administrative Tribunal in 
Vienna, arguing that the above-mentioned treatment has only happened by reason of their 
colour and place of birth. Their complaint was dismissed but later reversed by the 
Constitutional Court.
A further unwanted result of ethnic pro¿ ling is the strengthening of racial/ethnic 
essentialism, reductionism to black and white (Roma and Hungarian; Arab and non-Arab, 
etc.). Another related argument mentions the risks inherent in alienating crucial minority 
communities in the context of law enforcement (policing and prevention). The model of 
community policing emphasizes that local policing is most effectively done with active 
participation from the community. Law enforcement thus should not be an antagonistic, 
unjust, oppressive power, but a protector of peaceful, law-abiding people, with the criminals 
pitted as the enemy. With respect to terrorism, we should not overlook the importance of 
community cooperation. It is no coincidence that the Bush government identi¿ ed truck 
drivers, cab drivers and parking meter attendants as high-priority potential informants 
(helpful in identifying bombers or suicide bombers), and, above all, the Muslim community, 
which can detect suspicious behaviour.61 Indeed, most of the American terrorists identi¿ ed 
up until recently were caught based on community reports. It is worth considering that one 
of the very few terrorist arrests where the suspect was eventually charged, in Lackawana, 
58 [2004] UKHL 55, 9 December 2004.
59 Tribunal Constitucional, Sala Segunda, Sentencia 13/2001 de 29 Ene. 2001, rec. 490/1997.
60 See Opinion 2006/4 of the Network of Independent Experts on Fundamental Rights on ethnic 
pro¿ ling.
61 See, for example Brandl, S.: Back to the future: The implications of September 11, 2001 on 
law enforcement practice and policy. Ohio State Journal of Criminal Law, 1 (2003) 1, Osler, M.: 
Capone and Bin Laden: The failure of government at the cusp of war and crime. Baylor Law Review, 
55 (2003) 2.
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New York, a report from the local Muslim community tipped off the authorities, leading to 
the arrest.62 Further, false positives raise a special problem with respect to terrorism: it 
seems untenable to assume that only Arabs are involved in terrorist attacks. We need only 
mention a couple of incidents that happened on American soil: Richard Reid (the “shoe 
bomber”), a Brit from the West Indies; Jose Padilla (the “dirty bomb” terrorist of Chicago’s 
O’Hare Airport), a Hispanic man who converted to Islam while in jail; not to mention white 
Americans like John Walker Lindh (the American Taliban), Timothy McVeigh, and Charles 
Bishop.63
Yet another, straightforwardly pragmatic criticism towards ethnic pro¿ ling, however, 
has been calling attention to the practical ineffectiveness of racial pro¿ ling: inherent in the 
prima facie plausible reasoning based on statistics is a profound (and provable) error. From 
the practical point of view, racial pro¿ ling could only be justi¿ ed based on the assumption 
that the race or ethnicity of the person being pro¿ led is knowable and that there is a 
consistent and statistically signi¿ cant relationship between race or ethnicity and propensity 
to commit crime. In fact, neither of these is consistently true. Ethnic pro¿ ling assumes a 
consistent association, if not a causal relationship, between race/ethnicity and certain kinds 
of criminal activity. But policies premised on the notion that members of certain ethnic 
groups are more or less likely to sell drugs, carry ¿ rearms, or commit terrorist acts, are both 
under- and over-inclusive. They thus risk focusing undue law enforcement attention and 
resources on those who ¿ t the pro¿ le, while overlooking others who don not.64 Racial 
pro¿ les are, thus, both over-inclusive and under-inclusive–over-inclusive in the sense that 
many, indeed most, of the people who ¿ t into the category are entirely innocent, and under-
inclusive in the sense that many other types of criminals or terrorists who do not ¿ t the 
pro¿ le will thereby escape police attention. James Goldston argues that is it mistaken to 
believe that ethnic pro¿ ling is also problematic in the respect that it assumes that the race/
ethnicity of the person pro¿ led is knowable and determinate. But this is not always so.65 
Racial pro¿ ling also faces the problems of predictability and evasion: the more predictable 
police pro¿ les become, the easier it is for perpetrators to adapt to circumvent the pro¿ le. 
In the past decade or so, considerable research66 focused on the ef¿ cacy of ethnic pro¿ ling.
62 Harris, D. A.: New Risks; New Tactics: An Assessment of the Re-Assessment of Racial 
Pro¿ ling in the Wake of September 11, 2001. Utah Law Review, (2004), 933. 
63 Harris: op. cit. 940, see also Baynes, L.: Racial Pro¿ ling, September 11th and the Media. 
A Critical Race Theory Analysis. Virginia Sports and Entertainment Law Journal, 2 (2002) 1; or Joo, 
Th. W.: Presumed Disloyal: Executive Power, Judicial Deference, and the Construction of Race 
Before and After September 11. Columbia Human Rights Law Review, 34 (2002) 1.
64 Goldston, J.: Toward a Europe Without Ethnic Pro¿ ling. Justice Initiatives. June 2005.
65 Goldston: ibid. For example, according to a study by the World Bank in Romania, 61% of 
those classi¿ ed as Roma by the interviewers, did not claim themselves as such (the discrepancy in the 
identi¿ cation rates was 24% in Bulgaria and 38% in Hungary). The country has a population of 
23 million, with 2–2.5 million Roma, according to unof¿ cial estimates, yet only 409,111 identi¿ ed 
themselves as such at the 1992 census. See Ringold, D.– Orenstein, M. A.–Wilkens, E.: Roma in an 
expanding Europe. Breaking the poverty cycle. (A World Bank Study 2003) 29., http://www-wds.
worldbank.org/servlet/WDSContentServer/WDSP/IB/2003/01/07/000094946_02122404075867/
Rendered/INDEX/multi0page.txt. When a person interviewed identi¿ es herself as Roma, it will 
always be in accordance with the interviewer’s classi¿ cation. Ahmed, A.–Feliciano, C.–Emigh, R. J.: 
Ethnic Classi¿ cation in Eastern Europe. 10, http://www.sscnet.ucla.edu/soc/groups/ccsa/ahmed.PDF
66 Stuntz, W. J.: Local Policing After the Terror. Yale Law Review, 111 (2002) 8; Gross, S. R.–
Livingston, D.: Racial Pro¿ ling Under Attack. Columbia Law Review, 102 (2002) 5; Cuéllar, M.-F.: 
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Studies conducted in New Jersey and elsewhere have targeted stops based on racial 
pro¿ ling, involving vehicle checks and body searches. The aim was to discern how effective 
these measures were in detecting drug possession and illegal possession of weapons. The 
studies have clearly demonstrated that there was no signi¿ cant, tangible difference between 
the proportional hit rate within the white population and the non-white population. Not only 
did the study ¿ nd that the authorities habitually stopped a disproportionate number of non-
white drivers, but they have also con¿ rmed that the hit rate does not justify the utility of 
ethnic pro¿ ling. Evidence thus refutes the proposition that minorities are more likely to be 
involved in crime and highlights that racial pro¿ ling is an ineffective use of police resources, 
by engaging in stopping and searching practices that are likely to be unproductive. For 
example, despite the collection and trawling of the data of 8.3 million people, the mentioned 
Rasterfahndung operation in Germany “failed to identify a single terrorist”. In 1998, the 
U.S. Custom Service responded to allegations of racial and gender pro¿ ling and low hit 
rates across all ethnic groups. In 1998, 43% of searches that Customs performed were on 
African-Americans and Latino/as. US Customs changed its stop and search procedures 
removing race from the factors considered when stops were made and introduced 
observational techniques focusing on behaviours such as nervousness and inconsistencies in 
passenger explanations; intelligence improved the supervision of stop and search decisions. 
By 2000, the racial disparities in Customs searches had nearly disappeared. Customs 
conducted 75% fewer searches and their hit rate improved from under 5% to over 13%, the 
hit rate for all ethnic groups had become almost even. Using intelligence-based, race-neutral 
criteria allowed Customs to improve its effectiveness while stopping fewer innocent people, 
the vast majority of whom were people of colour.67 Other attempts to address pro¿ ling have 
included improving internal supervision, training and the development of early warning 
systems to identify of¿ cers who are potentially racially pro¿ ling. We might sum up the 
results thus: the retrospectively judged effectiveness (which was always assumed, rather 
than checked and con¿ rmed) turns out to be illusory and does not provide an appropriate 
policing, prevention and security policy. 
Racial pro¿ ling thus relies on the assumption that ethnicity and a high rate of 
criminality are connected, so the hit rate must be higher among, say, African-Americans. 
For a long time, no-one was asking for a proof of this seemingly sensible connection; after 
all, a suf¿ cient number of criminals were found among the disproportionately high number 
of minority members stopped. But researchers argue that this does not yield a cost-effective 
Choosing Anti-Terror Targets by National Origin and Race. Harvard Latino Law Review, 6 (2003) 9; 
Harris, D. A.: Using Race as a Factor in Assessing the Reasonableness of Fourth Amendment Activity: 
Description Yes; Prediction, No. Mississippi Law Journal, special ed., 73 (2003); Banks, R.: Beyond 
racial Pro¿ ling: Race, Policing, and the Drug War. Stanford Law Review, December, 56 (2003) 3; 
Banks, R.: Racial pro¿ ling and antiterrorism efforts. Cornell Law Review, 89 (2004) 2; Harris, D. A: 
Racial pro¿ ling revisited: “Just common sense” in the ¿ ght against terror? Criminal Justice, 17 (2002) 
2; Davies, Sh.: ReÀ ections on the Criminal Justice System after September 11, 2001.Ohio State 
Journal of Criminal Law, 1 (2003) 1; Ramirez, D.íHoopes, J.íQuinlan, T. L.: De¿ ning Racial 
Pro¿ ling in a Post-September 11 World. American Criminal Law Review, 40 (2003) 3; Braber, L.: 
Korematsu’s Ghost: A Post-September 11th Analysis of Race and National Security. Villanova Law 
Review, 47 (2002) 2.
67 ENAR-OSJI: Ethnic Pro¿ ling. 2009, 14. http://www.soros.org/initiatives/justice/focus/
equality_citizenship/articles_publications/publications/ethnic_20100512/Factsheet-ethnic-pro¿ ling-
20091001-ENG.pdf
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method because the number of false negatives and false positives is bound to be much too 
high.68 In other words, the measures have a disproportionate negative impact on the black 
(Roma, Arab) population that is law-abiding, while also reducing the possibility of ¿ nding 
perpetrators that belong to the majority population.69 
A recent pilot research project70 organized by the Helsinki Committee (HHC)71 
focusing on police stop and search practices and their discriminatory effects on Hungary’s 
largest ethnic minority, the Roma showed results that are very much in line with ¿ ndings in 
other countries. Since previous research has showed that discriminatory ID check methods 
are relevant to the differential treatment of the Roma,72 Strategies for Effective Police Stop 
and Search (STEPSS), an international project supported by the AGIS Program of the 
European Commission and the Open Society Institute and organized by the Open Society 
Justice Initiative was launched to change police stop and search policy and practice. For the 
purposes of the research, for the ¿ rst time in Hungary, broad-spectrum data collection on 
the ethnic aspects and general ef¿ ciency of ID checks has been conducted. 
The project involved the close cooperation of the HHC, the National Police 
Headquarters (NPH), the Hungarian Police College (HPC) and selected representatives 
from the Roma community who performed the internal monitoring of the project. The 
research was carried out for six months in three pilot sites across Hungary: Budapest’s 6th 
District, Szeged and Kaposvár. These three locations represent a broad range of different 
police districts with differing populations, crime pro¿ les and resources. Budapest’s 6th 
District covers a busy city-centre area and includes the capital’s main railway station. 
Szeged, with a population of 200,000, is a medium-sized district on the Romanian border. 
Kaposvár is a relatively rural police district with 120,000 inhabitants. 
The projects most important ¿ ndings were the following: the effectiveness of ID 
checks was determined by examining what percentage of ID checks are followed by further 
police measures. The project identi¿ ed three main types of follow-up procedures (i.e. 
68 See, for example Cuéllar: op. cit.; Baynes: op. cit. 12–13; Ramirez, D.–Hoopes, J.–Quinlan, 
T. L.: op. cit. 1213.
69 Consider the fact that the name of Yigal Amir, Yizchak Rabin’s assassin would not have 
cropped up based on any kind of assassin pro¿ le; nor would the person who ¿ rst blew up a commercial 
aircraft–she was a woman who wanted her husband dead in 1949. Nojeim, G. T.: Aviation Security 
Pro¿ ling and Passengers’ Civil Liberties. Air and Space Lawyer, 13 (1998) 3, 5. 
70 For more detailed descriptions see Kádár, A.–Pap, A. L.: A Police Ethnic Pro¿ ling in Hungary–
An empirical research. Acta Juridica Hungarica, 50 (2009) 3, 253–267 or Kádár, A.–Pap, A. L.–Tóth, B.: 
Police ethnic pro¿ ling in Hungary. European Police Science and Research Bulletin CEPOL, 
November, (2009) 2, 4–6.
71 For the full report see Kádár, A.–Körner, J.–Moldova, Zs.–Tóth, B.: Control(led) Group. Final 
Report on the Strategies for Effective Police Stop and Search (STEPSS) Project. Budapest, 2008. The 
report is available on the Helsinki Committee’s website:
http://helsinki.hu/dokumentum/MHB_STEPSS_US.pdf
72 In 2005, a research carried out under the aegis of the Open Society Justice Initiative found 
that the Roma are indeed discriminated against in the context of ID checks by the police. Discrimination 
was especially conspicuous in the practice of stopping pedestrians, with Roma pedestrians 
disproportionately stopped are more likely to experience disrespectful treatment. See: Pap, A. L.–
Miller, J.–Gounev, P.–Wagman, D.– Balogi, A.–Bezlov, T.–Simonovits, B.–Vargha, L.: Racism and 
Police Stops–Adapting US and British Debates to Continental Europe. European Journal of 
Criminology, (2008) 5, 161–191 and Pap, A. L.: Police ethnic pro¿ ling in Hungary–Lessons from an 
international research. Regio, 10 (2007), 117–140.
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positive results proving that the check was well-grounded): (i) arrests, (ii) short-term arrests 
and (iii) petty offence procedures initiated (including on-the-spot ¿ nes).
Overall, including traf¿ c related checks, only 1% of ID checks led to an arrest, 2% led 
to a short-term arrest and 18% to petty offence procedures. If ID checks related to traf¿ c 
offences are removed, the remaining checks result in 2% arrest, 3% short-term arrest, 19% 
petty offense procedure and 76% no further action taken. For comparison, in the UK 
nationally 10–13% of stop and searches lead to arrest.73 On the whole, it appears that the 
police use of ID checks is ineffective; large numbers of people are being inconvenienced 
with little result. This data refutes the argument that extensive checks are an ef¿ cient tool 
against criminality, and highlights the sheer amount of police time wasted conducting 
stops. 
It is noteworthy, that there was signi¿ cant variation in the rate of ef¿ ciency depending 
upon what ground was recorded as the basis for the ID check. Most ID checks, 37%, took 
place during the course of traf¿ c controls. A relatively high proportion of checks, 19%, 
were based upon the suspicion of a petty offence, 8% of all checks were pursuant to 
intensive controls, and only 2% of checks were related to the suspicion of a criminal act. 
ID checks recorded under the “other” category make up a third of all stops; this proportion 
rises to 50% when we removed traf¿ c control stops from the data. The examination of the 
ef¿ ciency rate of the ID checks relative to their different grounds showed that the most 
frequently quoted grounds were the least ef¿ cient.
Arrests and signi¿ cant percentages of short-term arrests only followed those ID checks 
that were related to the suspicion of a crime, petty offence or ¿ nding a wanted person. Out 
of these latter cases, however, only those checks that were initiated due to the suspicion of a 
petty offence made up a substantial portion of all the checks. Overall, traf¿ c control 
constituted the largest reason for the ID checks, though in 84% of these cases no further 
action was taken. 
Based on the data collected, it appears that the majority of ID checks take place on 
public premises (streets, parks and roads account for 78%), while relatively few checks are 
performed in pubs, discos or similar places (6%). The temporal distribution of the checks is 
relatively even, with 21% occurring in the morning (from 6 a.m. till noon), 29% in the 
afternoon (from noon till 6 p.m.), 30% in the evening (from 6 p.m. to 10 p.m.), and the 
remaining 20% at night.
Police of¿ cers stop and check more men than women (75% and 25%, respectively), 
and in line with international trends, young people are more likely to be checked. Individuals 
belonging to the age group 14–29 represent 43% of all checks, whereas their ratio within 
the population is 22%.74 Based on the overall data collected, police in Hungary are most 
likely to check young men between the ages 14–29.
The data also shows that Roma are disproportionately targeted for ID checks. Within 
the framework of the project, 22% of all persons checked by the police were of Roma 
origin (according to the assessment of the of¿ cer performing the check), as opposed to 75% 
being identi¿ ed as “white”. The remaining 3% were identi¿ ed as “black”, “Asian”, “Arab” 
or other. According to reliable sociological research, the estimated proportion of Roma 
73 See: Jones, A.–Singer, L.: Statistics on Race and the Criminal Justice System–2006/7. 
London, 2008.
74 Based on the ¿ gures of the 2001 census, see
www.nepszamlalas.hu/hun/kotetek/18/tables/load1_12.html.
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people within the total Hungarian population (of 10,045,000) is approximately 6,2% (i.e. 
their actual number is around 620,000).75 Thus, Roma are more than three times more likely 
to be stopped than their percentage of the general population would indicate.
The results show that Roma youth are especially likely to be targeted for ID checks. 
The proportion of Roma youth between age 14 and 16 who were stopped and checked 
during the project period was signi¿ cantly higher than the already high general representation 
of Roma within the sample (32% as opposed to 22%). 
The data in the research shows that ID checks of Roma are no more likely to yield 
results than measures enforced in relation to non-Roma. It is often argued that a 
disproportionate targeting of ethnic minority groups is justi¿ ed by differential rates of 
criminal involvement. The hit rate of police checks, however, shows no signi¿ cant 
differences by ethnic group. On a national level, 78% of ID checks involving Roma were 
“unsuccessful” in the sense that no further measure was required after the check. For non-
Roma this ratio was 79%. The percentage of checks followed by a petty offense proceeding 
for Roma and non-Roma was 19% and 18%, respectively. Rates of arrests and short-term 
arrests are practically the same within the Roma and the non-Roma sample. In the country’s 
capital, Budapest: 80% of the checks of Roma did not require any further police action, 
whereas the same proportion for non-Roma was 59%. If we compare this with the fact that 
33% of all the persons checked are of Roma origin (which is a serious over-representation 
relative to their proportion of 5–10% in Budapest), we can see that the problem is more 
acute in Budapest than in the other pilot sites.
In sum, in Hungary, the annual number of ID checks (per 1,000 people) is high when 
compared with other nations in Europe. The police practice behind this result is based on 
the conviction that randomly initiated ID checks constitute an ef¿ cient crime prevention 
and detection strategy. However, in the sample, only approximately 20% of the ID checks 
were followed up by any measure, and of these measures, 18% merely involved the initiation 
of a petty offense proceeding (i.e. proceedings launched due to transgressions of minor 
signi¿ cance). Arrests followed only 1% of the checks in our sample. Another important 
conclusion of the research is that Roma are disproportionately targeted by ID checks. Even 
though their proportion of the general population is only between 6 and 8%, persons 
perceived to be of Roma origin by the acting of¿ cers constituted 22% of those who were ID 
checked. The research also refuted the ostensibly rational argument that is frequently 
presented to justify disproportionality; namely that the Roma are over-represented among 
offenders, therefore the practice of checking them more often is objectively reasonable. 
Concluding remarks
Using Rebekah Delsol’s words, to summarize the racial pro¿ ling discourse, we can say that 
there is no evidence that pro¿ ling works, considerable evidence that it does not, and some 
disturbing indications that it may actually hamper law enforcement. When police or 
immigration of¿ cials act on prejudice, they blind themselves to genuinely suspicious forms 
of behaviour. Pro¿ les are both under- and over-inclusive; that is, they risk being too narrow 
and missing real suspects or they are too broad, in which case they are expensive to apply 
75 Hablicsek, L.–Gyenei, M.–Kemény, I.: Kísérleti számítások a roma lakosság területi 
jellemzĘinek alakulására és 2021-ig történĘ elĘrebecslésére, (Experimental methods for predicting 
the territorial characteristics of the Roma population until 2021). 63, see
http://www.nepinfo.hu/index.php?p=605&m=1003 (hereafter: Hablicsek).
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in terms of manpower and target large numbers of completely innocent people. More 
broadly, pro¿ ling feeds and aggravates existing mistrust and consequent hostility and lack 
of cooperation in ¿ ghting crime and terrorism among the very communities where support 
is most needed for counter-terrorism and immigration control.76 Critics have noted that 
racial/ethnic pro¿ ling exacts a high price on individuals, groups, and communities that are 
singled out for disproportionate attention. For the individual stopped and detained the 
experience, sometimes of frequent encounters with the police, can be frightening and 
humiliating. Racial/ethnic pro¿ ling stigmatizes whole groups, contributing to the over-
representation of ethnic minorities in other parts of the criminal justice system, legitimising 
racism, scapegoating and fostering mistrust between communities and the police. This in 
turn destroys the trust of those communities in the police and reduces their willingness to 
cooperate in criminal or terrorism investigations and turn to the police to control crime in 
their neighbourhoods.77
Given the elusive nature of “security” in general and the peculiarity of the post 
9/11-world, the practice of racial pro¿ ling nonetheless remains persistent and to a 
considerable degree popular amongst not only law enforcement of¿ cers, but also the civilian 
majority middle class. It is ironic that it was right around the time of the World Trade Center 
attacks that racial pro¿ ling suffered decisive rejection within professional as well as political 
circles in the USA. In the fall of 1999, 81% of those asked opposed stops and vehicle 
control based on ethnic pro¿ ling. By contrast, in a poll conducted a few weeks after 
September 11, 2001, 58% approved of the idea that Arabs (including American citizens) be 
subject to stricter security checks before a À ight.78 
This article has argued that besides the doctrinal debate between “security” and 
“liberty”, there is another important and slightly overlooked question to be investigated: the 
actual ef¿ cacy value of policies and law enforcement measures that trigger the entire 
“liberty vs. security” polemics. What needs to be kept in mind is that “security” itself is a 
social construct, and affected by prejudices and preconceptions within society. We also need 
to bear in mind that neither “security” nor “ef¿ cacy” can be seen as absolute and isolated 
concepts. Even if the majority would actually feel secure when law enforcement of¿ cers 
stop members of a minority which is being perceived as potentially dangerous or prone to 
criminality, this cannot and should not make these measures constitutionally acceptable–not 
even if, given the peculiarities of the securitarian dynamics, the ef¿ cacy standards would 
have been met. A possible solution would be to abandon the shallow and hollow rhetoric of 
“liberty vs. security” and return to the well-beaten path of traditional constitutional 
jurisprudence–and reinstate balancing mechanisms which operate with À exible and complex 
schemes (including for example dignity or equality) when assessing the harm criterion. 




78 Gross, S. R.–Livingston, D.: op. cit. 1413.
